Marriage law, as part of general pattern of family, is a policy instrument that defines optimal behavioral standards for matrimonial relationship through ordaining sanctions. Imposing such standards regardless of their consequences may result in anxiety in the family institution and subsequently in the society itself and may raise the motivation of defensive behaviors among people and as a result will increase the cost of legislative and judicial system. Economic approach to the marriage law with analyzing aftermath of laws on couple's behavior is looking for minimizing marriage costs including couple, society and judiciary system costs, and maximizing the cost of its inefficient breach. Incentive role of family law and its supplements, such as labor laws, tax and employment affairs etc., on the rate of marriage and divorce, the amount of dowry and other couple's decisions is a topic that economics of family law is recently very focused on. This article, in the form of “contract” and “market” and by using of concepts including costs, benefits, efficiency, competition and monopolywill present the economic analysis of marriage and other related legal concepts and is to introduce a new approach to Iranian family legislators and judges.
شاکری، ع. (1385)، اقتصاد خرد2، نظریهها و کاربردها، نشر نی.
صفایی، م. و امامی، ا. (1388). مختصر حقوق خانواده، چاپ هفدهم، تهران، نشر میزان.
عراقی، ع. (1386). حقوق کار، چاپ هفتم، تهران، انتشارات سمت.
گلریز، ح. (1385). فرهنگ توصیفی اصطلاحات پول، بانکداری و مالیه بینالملل، چاپ دوم، تهران، فرهنگ معاصر.
قوانین
قانون حمایت خانواده مصوب 1391.
قانون مجازات اسلامی مصوب 1375.
قانون مدنی جلد اول (مصوب 1307) و دوم (مصوب1313-1314).
قانون تعیین مدت اعتبار گواهی عدم امکان سازش مصوب 1376.
Babcock, B.A. (1978). Sex Discrimination and the Law: Causes and Remedies, Boston, Brown Clark.
Bix, B (1998). Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of Premarital Agreements and How We Think About Marriage, William and Mary Law Review 40, pp 145-207.
Brinig, M (1994). Finite Horizons: The American Family, International Journal of Children’s Rights 2,pp 293-315.
Brinig, M (2000). From Contract to Covenant: Beyond the Law and Economics of the Family, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
Cohen, L (1987). Marriage, Divorce, and Quasi Rents: or, ‘I Gave Him the Best Years of My Life, Journal of Legal Studies 16, 267-303.
Cohen, L (2004). Marriage: The Long-Term Contract. In Antony W. Dnes and Robert Rowthorn eds. The Law and Economics of Marriage and Divorce, Cambridge University Press, pp. 10-34.
Cooter, R and Ulen, T (2000), Law and Economics, 3rd ed, Longman, Addison Wesley.
Dnes, A(2004). Cohabitation and Marriage. In Antony W. Dnes and Robert Rowthorn eds. The Law and Economics of Marriage and Divorce, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp 118-131.
Eekelaar, J and Mavis, M (1986). Maintenance after Divorce, Oxford University Press.
England, P and Farkas G(1986). Households, Employment and Gender: A Social, Economic and Demographic View, Hawthorne, NY: Aldine.
Folbre, N (2001). The Invisible Heart: Economics and Family Values, New York, The New Press.
Garrison, M (1991). Good Intentions Gone Awry: The Impact of New York's Equitable Distribution Law on Divorce Outcomes, Brooklyn Law Review 57, pp 621-754.
Grossbard, Sh (2007).The Economics of Marriage, San Diego State University, pp 1-Available at: www.cesifo-group.de/link/lecture-grossbard-1.pdf
Grossbard, Sh and Lemennicier, B(2000). Marriage contracts and the law-and-economics of marriage: an Austrian perspective, The Journal of Socio-Economics, vol. 28(6), pp 665-690
Krause, H (2000). Marriage for the New Millennium: Heterosexual, Same Sex – Or Not at All? Family Law Quarterly 34, pp 271-300.
Nock Steven, L and Brinig, M (2004). Weak men and disorderly women: divorce and the division of labor. In Antony W. Dnes and Robert Rowthorn eds. The Law and Economics of Marriage and Divorce, Cambridge University Press, pp 171-190.
Rasmusen, E and Evans Stake, J (1998). Lifting the Veil of Ignorance: Personalizing the Marriage Contract, Indiana Law Journal 73, 453-502.
Parkman, A (2004). Mutual consent divorce. In Antony W. Dnes and Robert Rowthorn eds. The Law and Economics of Marriage and Divorce, Cambridge University Press, pp 57-69.
Rowthorn, R (2004). Marriage as a signal. In Antony W. Dnes and Robert Rowthorn eds.The Law and Economics of Marriage and Divorce, Cambridge University Press, pp 132-156.
Scott, E (2004). Marital commitment and the legal regulation of divorce. In Antony W. Dnes and Robert Rowthorn eds. The Law and Economics of Marriage and Divorce, Cambridge University Press pp 35-56.
Scott, E (1990). Rational Decision-making about Marriage and Divorce, Virginia Law Review 76, pp 9-94.
Shavell, S (2004). Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law, Harvard University Press.
Siow, A (2003). The Economics of Marriage 30 Years after Becker, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, 2003 CEA meetings in Ottawa. Available at: www.economics.utoronto.ca/siow/papers/becker.pdf
Spaht, K (2004). Louisiana’s Covenant Marriage Law: Recapturing the Meaning of Marriage for the Sake of the Children. In Antony W. Dnes and Robert Rowthorn eds. The Law and Economics of Marriage and Divorce, Cambridge University Press, pp 92-117.
Tsaoussis, A (2006). Less Status, More Contract: An Economic Analysis Of Contract Marriage, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki; Athens University of Economics & Business, pp 1-18.
Available at :http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1119664
Veljanovski, C (2006). The Economics of Law, 2nd ed, London, Great Britain pub.
Zelder, M (2004). For better or for worse? Is bargaining in marriage and divorce efficient? In Antony W. Dnes and Robert Rowthorn eds., The Law and Economics of Marriage and Divorce, Cambridge University Press, pp 157-170.
Tazikinejad, A., Shafihi Sardasht, J., & Shamsyan, E. (2014). Marriage From the Perspective of Economics of Law. Journal of Family Research, 10(1), 7-29.
MLA
Ali Tazikinejad; Jafar Shafihi Sardasht; Esmaeil Shamsyan. "Marriage From the Perspective of Economics of Law", Journal of Family Research, 10, 1, 2014, 7-29.
HARVARD
Tazikinejad, A., Shafihi Sardasht, J., Shamsyan, E. (2014). 'Marriage From the Perspective of Economics of Law', Journal of Family Research, 10(1), pp. 7-29.
VANCOUVER
Tazikinejad, A., Shafihi Sardasht, J., Shamsyan, E. Marriage From the Perspective of Economics of Law. Journal of Family Research, 2014; 10(1): 7-29.